Human Rights Practices in the Arab States: The Modern Impact of Sharī’a Values by Dudley, James
NOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN THE ARAB STATES:
THE MODERN IMPACT OF SHARI'A VALUES
I. INTRODUCTION
Shar-i'a, the traditional law of Islam, provides a basis for analysis
of Islamic human rights practices, as it traditionally defines many
aspects of Islamic criminal, property, and family law. Even where
supplanted by Westernized administrative and commercial codes,
Shari 'a values continue to have a significant impact on social and
governmental behavior.
This Note is based on the following four premises:
(1) Human rights abuses result from the deliberate diminish-
ment of individual human significance, as emphasis is-placed on
social and political conformity rather than individual freedom.
(2) Islam views the individual as divinely endowed with social
and political rights, but these rights exist only in relation to a far
greater obligation to the communal group and the State.
(3) Despite the harshness of its punishments, Shari'a expresses
the significance of the individual both substantively and procedural-
ly, and it defines acceptable social and governmental conduct. Also,
Shar'a includes doctrinal mechanisms for adaptation to changing
political climates and modern life; it is not bound totally by the
Koranic tradition.
(4) An incisive critique of human rights practices in Middle
Eastern nations can be predicated on these traditional Shari'a
values, freeing one from the dangers of imposing an analytical
framework without consideration of uniquely Islamic sociopolitical
characteristics.
This Note undertakes a comparative examination of the contem-
porary influence of Shari 'a values on the human rights practices
of four Middle Eastern states: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and
Iraq. These are among the oldest states in Islam, and the tradi-
tions of Shari'ahave had the fullest impact on their societies. They
share the Arab ethnic heritage, with its characteristic spiritual,
communal, and political values, and they span the spectrum of
governmental types found in the Islamic world.
The Hashemite kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Jordan are typical
of traditional-conservative states, displaying a commitment to the
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preservation of the society of the Koran. Of the two, Jordan adopts
the more liberal posture. Egypt and Iraq, on the other hand, are
praetorian-populist states emphasizing radical, secularized
sociopolitical modernization. In comparing the two, Egypt is per-
ceived as the less repressive.1 While the traditional states are at-
tempting to resolve the problems of modernization within tradi-
tional legal institutions applying traditional Islamic values, the
praetorian states have abolished such institutions to a great ex-
tent. They have attempted to substitute more "rational" values
which have not always coincided with traditional beliefs regarding
the nature and dignity of Man.
II. MAN AND STATE IN ISLAMIC TRADITION
A. The Sources and Character of Shari'a
In the traditional view, Islam is not only a religion. It is also
a defined community and a total way of life. The community is
composed of all who are ready to surrender their personal autonomy
to Allah,2 with more emphasis placed on conformity in ritual and
lifestyle than on doctrinal unity.' The traditional goal of Islamic
jurisprudence has been to enforce the religious, communal, and
political duties of Koranic society. By following a prescribed pat-
tern of righteousness, the Moslem can hope to build the perfect
earthly society.4 However, "[t]hose who do not accept these obliga-
tions have no rights, and any claims of freedom that they make
upon society lack justification."5
Shari'a. literally "the path to the watering place," incorporates
a number of sources to form a body of law defining and regulating
The political taxonomy employed in this study is taken from J. BLONDEL, COMPARING
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 155-56, 203-17 (1972).
' The term "Moslems" refers to those who have surrendered themselves to Allah. "Islam"
is the state of their surrender.
There would seem to be no word in Arabic, or indeed in any other Islamic
language meaning "orthodox." The word usually translated "orthodox," sunni,
actually means rather "orthoprax".... A good Muslim is not one whose belief
conforms to a given pattern, whose commitment may be expressed in intellectual
terms that are congruent with an accepted statement (as in the case generally
of Protestant Christianity), but one whose commitment may be expressed in prac-
tical terms that conform to an accepted code.
W. SMITH, ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY 20 (1957).
"Dar al-Islam," the "Abode of Islam," is the term most frequently employed by Koranic
scholars in reference to the Islamic polity. See F. HASSAN, THE CONCEPT OF STATE AND LAW
IN ISLAM 206 (1981).
Said, Human Rights in Islamic Perspectives, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 86, 92 (1980).
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almost all Islamic social and economic intercourse.6 Principally, they
are: (1) the scriptures of the Koran; (2) the sunna or "model
behavior" derived from hadith ("traditions") surrounding the life
of the Prophet; (3) the ijma or "consensus" of the ulama ("learned
ones"), the religious jurists of traditional Islam; and (4) the pro-
cess of kiy-as, the analogical reasoning used by the ulama to con-
strue the Koran and sunna and apply them to contemporary issues.'
In addition to its four principal sources, Shari'a has borrowed legal
doctrines from (5) pre-Islamic customs, notably those arising from
ethnic and tribal identities;8 (6) Roman law;' and elements from
the laws of various Middle Eastern ethnic groups, for example,
the Hebrews' Talmudic law'0 and that of the Sassanians."
In addition to these currently accepted sources of Shari'a, there
is another potential source which may attain considerable impor-
tance in nations with large Shi'ite populations and in those with
strong fundamentalist movements. IjtihTid or "systematic original
thinking" was employed until the tenth century by the mujtahids,
those who endeavored to gain a thorough understanding of the
will of Allah for circumstances not mentioned specifically in the
Koran." There are at least three reasons why ijtihgid may reat-
tain its former significance in Islamic jurisprudence: (1) its
faithfulness to the Koran, which excites fundamentalist believers;
(2) its potential for bringing Koranic standards to bear on every
aspect of modern life; and (3) its elevation of the ulama to the
6 F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 99; Schacht, Theology and Law in Islam, in THEOLOGY AND
LAW IN ISLAM 3,4 (G. von Grunebaum ed. 1971). See generally S. NASR, THE CONCEPT AND REALI-
TY OF FREEDOM IN ISLAM AND ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION (1978); F. ROSENTHAL, THE MUSLIM CON-
CEPT OF FREEDOM PRIOR TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1960); J. SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION TO
ISLAMIC LAW (1964); A. WAFI, AL-HURRIYAH AL-MADANIYYAH FIL ISLAM (1967).
7 See generally F. RAHMAN, ISLAM 68-84, 100-16 (2d ed. 1979), for an excellent discussion
of the component elements of Shari'a. See also J. SCHACHT, ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN
JURISPRUDENCE 42, 134-37 (1959). While the kiyas process has systematized Sharl'a, it is sup-
plemented occasionally in modern times by the twin doctrines of maslaha and 'illa, which
can enable the otherwise immutable law to keep pace with modern life. See generally Khad-
duri, The Maslaha (Public Interest) and 'Ilia (Cause in Islamic Law), 12 N. Y. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 213 (1979); Yamani, The Eternal Shar'a, 12 N. Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 205 (1979);
See notes 61-65 infra and accompanying text.
' See J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 15-22.
' Id. at 20-21. But see Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM.
J. COMP. L. 187, 190-91 (1978); Vesey-Fitzgerald, The Alleged Debt of Islamic to Roman Law,
67 L. Q. REV. 81 (1967).
J  SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 21-22. But see Badr, supra note 9, at 193-95.
" J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 21-22.
' Id. at 48-49. See also F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 37-38; R. LEVY, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF ISLAM 180-81 (1957); F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 72; Weisse, Interpretation inIslamic Law:
-The Theory of IjtihEd, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 199 (1978).
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penultimate level of social and religious authority, thereby rees-
tablishing a theocratic and authoritarian concept of law and govern-
ment dominated by the clergy.
Whereas the Sunni jurists believe that kiyas and ijmi have been
employed so thoroughly as to establish the main body of Shari'a
as an immutable entity,13 Shi'ite scholars point to the sectarian
divisions" caused by differences between kiyas and the apparent
absence of Koranic precedent 15 as evidence that Allah cannot in-
tend such reasoning to be a primary basis for law. Likewise, Shi'ites
eschew the hadith as a somewhat idolatrous and ethnically biased
attempt to establish human folklore as a revelation of Divine Will. 6
Instead, the Shi'ites posit that the mujtahids are divinely gifted
in their ability to fathom the Mind of Allah, and that they establish
anew in every generation the relevant applications of Koranic
justice. 7 This accounts for the tremendous popularity and political
power enjoyed by Shi'ite leaders who have a recognized gift for
the application of Shar'a to modern circumstances. 8
IS See I. QUTAYBA, TA'WIL MUKHTALIF AL-HADITH 331 (1326 A.H.) (holding that ijma is a
"surer vehicle of truth" than even the most well-established hadith); R. LEVY. supra note
12, at 180-81; J. SCHACHT, suipra note 6, at 69-72; F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 77-78. However,
Hassan has noted that:
A fortiori, the expositions of the four classical schools [established by Abu Hanifa,
Hambal, Malik, and Shafil are entitled to the highest weight and respect, but
it is submitted that it is impossible to offer new interpretations for new situa-
tions, or to modify existing ones in light of contemporary circumstances by those
who are learned in the law.
F. HASSAN. supra note 4, at 39.
1, E.g., A. AL-TABARI, KAMiL-I-BAHAI 31 (1323 A.H.); H. KILANI, QAWANIN AL-USUAL 303,311
(1858). See R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 181.
Sunni jurists hold that once the four primary schools of law were established by Abu
Hanifa, Hambal, Malik, and Shaft, all questions essential to kiyas were thoroughly discussed
and settled, and a consensus developed against further independent legal inquiry. Conse-
quently, "the door of ijtihad was closed," and there issued from the four schools a demand
for tadid, the unquestioning acceptance of the doctrines of established schools and authorities.
N. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 80-82 (1964).
" Sura 16:4 ("We have set down to you the Reminder, the Koran, .... that you may
explain to men what has been set down to you and perhaps they may reflect."). Accord,
R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 180. But see F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 38 (quoting an ancient
hadith in which Mohammed allegedly approves of independent inquiry).
1" See HASSEN, KAMIL-I-BAHX I 31 (1323 A.H.); A. QASIM, QAWANIN AL-USUAL 303,311 (1858);
R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 181.
17 F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 125-27; R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 181-82.
The popularity of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini presents an example. In effect, the Shi'ites
substitute for ijma the authority of an imam or "leader," a mujtahid who becomes the
final human authority with respect to Shar;7'a H. AMILI, MA'ALIM AL-DIN 99-101 (1301 A.H.);
I. GOLDZIHER, VORLESUNGEN 215 (2d ed. 1925). Thus, while Sunnism has become a religion of
ijmd, Shi'ism is essentially a religion of personal authority. F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at
173-74.
SHARI'A LAW
The modern legal substance of Sha 'a includes juridical reason-
ing, criminal law, marriage and family law, charitable gifts, and
laws regulating estates and inheritance. 9 However, such a wide
range of regulation rests on very little Koranic authority. Of the
Koran's 6,237 verses, approximately 600 refer to legal matters, and
Western lawyers would regard no more than 190 as modern legal
material.' This scarcity of scriptural guidance has left Shari'a free
to develop along many lines, resulting in today's diverse schools
of thought.21 While the several schools may differ in their scrip-
tural exegeses and their prescribed kiyds, their fundamental social
teachings are remarkably similar. This suggests an Islamic con-
sensus regarding certain basic personal and property rights which
can be compared with the current human rights practices of Arab
governments.
1. The Function of the State
The purpose of the traditional Islamic State is to enforce the
principles of Shari'a. This ensures an environment which satisfies
the socio-religious needs of the ummah or "community of
believers."' The Western notion of state sovereignty does not ex-
ist in Islam, as all sovereignty belongs to Allah alone. Therefore,
the State accepts the role of kaliphate ("vice-regency"), the real
power being vested not in a single ruler but in all who believe
and follow Shari'a law.' The legitimacy of the government depends
on its ability to enforce Shari'a provisions regarding religious prac-
tice and socioeconomic welfare. 4 Rulers are expected to be judged
19 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 124-87 (considered the authoritative English-language
survey of Shar-'a provisions in these areas of law).
' Badr, supra note 9. at 188.
21 See F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 81-83 (a concise review of the origins of the traditional
legal schools); J. SCHACHT, supra note 7, at 21-132 (a more comprehensive comparative
analysis).
F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 4647; F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 1; Said, supra note 5. at 87.
The kaliphate "is not the exclusive birthright of any individual or clan or class of peo-
ple; it is the collective right of all those who accept and admit God's absolute sovereignty
over themselves and adopt the divine code, conveyed through the Prophet, and the law
above all laws and regulations." F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 72. The Khalifa or Caliph, literal-
ly a substitute for the Prophet, is an institution based on this notion of "vice-regency."
It is the actual form of government adopted after the Prophet's death. Although the Khalifa
was initially an elected position, it became a hereditary form of autocracy wherein the
Khalif was deemed a trustee of state power. This power was to be exercised in accordance
with Shar7'a principles and values. Id. at 72-73. See generally R. LEvY, supra note 12, at
271-99. See also F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 79-81 (a concise account of the early evolution
of the Khalifa).
2 F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 73-75. Said, supra note 5, at 87-88.
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by the same Sharia's standards applied to all people, and an
elaborate system of shura, or "counsel," among believers exists
to hold the government accountable for its actions."
Political legitimacy in Islam also depends on the ruler's ability
to protect the Islamic culture's most important community, the
kinship group. Most Moslems have lived in a community of family
and tribe for their entire lives, and Islamic tradition holds that
faith and community are woven together inseparably in a social
fabric of relationships with neighbors, nature, and the
supernatural.2" A ruler justifies his position only by success in his
relationships, whether with his own group or with Allah. Any ruler
who isolates himself from his communal group may face rebellion
and ouster.' Because believers are vested by Allah with the
kaliphate, they confer upon a ruler the right to govern. However,
once they select a ruler, their right to change the laws of the state
is limited, as they must maintain an environment consistent with
Shari'a and protected from any revisionism."
Islam has witnessed a steady progression of absolute
authoritarian rulers who have sought to legitimate their reigns
by espousing Shari'alstandards and meeting the needs of power-
ful communal groups within their various states.' As long as a
ruler protects the ummah against any erosion or revision of
religious practice, any political opposition is viewed as a sacrilege.
Support of various communal groups whose interests are serviced
by the government similarly legitimates political power. Rebellion
against a ruler supported by leading clans and interest groups
is tantamount to rebellion against the Divine Will of Allah.10 The
ruler who alienates himself from the values and interests of his
people meets with political catastrophe.31
" R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 294-96; Said, supra note 5, at 87. The shura concept has been
seen as the Koranic command for popular participation in government. F. HASSAN, supra
note 4, at 47.
" M. HALPERN, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
13-14 (1963); R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 271-72.
" Iran's Shah Reza Pahlavi was an example. See also M. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 14.
However, the overall inclination of early Islamic jurists was to insist on obedience to "un-
just" rulers, rather than suffer "lawlessness." See F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 51-53; F.
RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 169, 237-40.
28 See M. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 217-19; Said, supra note 5, at 87. See generally M. NAD-
vI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS: IN THE LIGHT OF THE KORAN AND HADITH (1966).
"See generally R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 277-94.
This view is reinforced by the tendency toward Determinism inherent in much of Islamic
thought. See Said, supra note 5, at 91-94 for an interesting discussion of the Islamic con-
cept of freedom.
11 E.g., Iran's Shah Reza Pahlavi.
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Substantial changes in traditional Islamic governments can suc-
ceed only if the proponent first overcomes a presumption of il-
legitimacy. This is very difficult in light of the close nexus between
perceived "righteousness" and social relationships. The reformer
must win the support of significant communal and interest groups
whose needs are not met by the status quo. He needs the blessing
of religious leaders who will attest to his superior obedience to
the Divine Will. Armed strength alone is insufficient to gain political
acceptance, but in reality it encourages the communal and religious
support necessary for Islamic political legitimacy."
2. The Status of the Individual
Every Moslem must serve Allah with his whole being. No other
party can discharge the believer's religious duties or obtain for
him a divine reprieve should he fail to obey.'M As Allah's personal
representative on earth, the believer is free to seek inward spiritual
and philosophical perfection, but his external freedom is limited
by the ummah, and his personal rights can be realized only in sub-
mission to the Divine Will expressed in Shari'a.Y Thus, there is
tremendous cultural and communal pressure on the believer to
think as he wishes, as long as he outwardly conforms to the status
quo. This willingness to subordinate one's personal needs and rights
to the dictates of the communal group is a most important factor
in analyzing human rights in Islamic states.
The commitment to sociopolitical conformity is illustrated well
by the application of Shari'a law to criminals. Many alleged human
rights violations occur in the area of punishment for criminal of-
fenses. The Western concept of rehabilitation does not exist in
Shari'a, which prescribes an "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth"
theory of retaliation. Capital punishment is the mandatory penal-
See generally G. VON GRUNEBAUM, MEDIEVAL ISLAM 169 (1946); I. KHALDUN, THE MUQAD-
DIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY, vol. I at 252-86, 305-07; vol. II at 103-55 (F. Rosenthal
trans. 1958); A. VON KREMER, GESCHICHTE DER HERRSCHENDEN IDEEN DES ISLAMS 416 (1868);
A. VON KREMER, KULTURGESCHICHTE DES ORIENTS 403 (1875).
' "Every soul earns but for itself, and thus shall you return unto your Lord." Sura 17:15;
25:18; and 31:7.
, See Said, supra note 5, at 91-94. The concept of freedom in Islam implies a conscious
rejection of a purely liberal and individualistic philosophy as the meaning of life or the
goal of society. "The goal of freedom is human creativity, but freedom is defined as belong-
ing to the community and participating in its cultural creation.... From the Islamic perspec-
tive, the anarchy of liberal individualism cannot be a creative seedbed of culture." Id. at 93.
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ty for willful murder,' but unintentional murder or manslaughter
carries only a heavy fine as a penalty." Non-fatal wounds "should
be punished by retaliation; but whoever remits it ... it is an ex-
piation for him.""7 The punishment imposed is not to exceed the
harm wrongfully inflicted.'
Because of the rural or nomadic histories of many Islamic peoples,
the idea of imprisonment for criminal offenses is relatively new
to Middle Eastern justice." Most petty offenses were at one time
punished by flogging to provide a public example and return the
offender to the ummah as quickly as possible."' Today this penalty
is seldom used outside Saudi Arabia. 1
Until recently, slavery was another aspect of human rights on
which Islamic and Western standards differed. The Koran allows
the taking of slaves from the armies and lands of nonbelievers dur-
ing holy wars, and their purchase in public markets. No Moslem
can hold another in bondage; only non-Moslems may be enslaved. 2
With the exception of some bedouin tribes on the Arabian penin-
sula, the new Arab states established after the First World War
brought an eventual end to slavery.3
Shari'a contains many prohibitions against racism, labeling it
5 See J. SCHACHT, supra note 7, at 175, 181-85.
According to Bedouin ideas, a member of the tribe of the killer, and even more
than one, could be killed if homicide had occurred. Islam allows only the killer
himself (or several killers for one slain) to be put to death, and only if he is fully
responsible and has acted clearly with deliberate intent; Islamic law further recom-
mends waiving retaliation. The execution is carried out with the sword.
Id. at 185.
* Id, at 181 (the payment of "blood-money"). See also Anderson, Homicide in Islamic Law,
13 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 811-21 (1958).
" Sura 5:49.
' J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 185 ("Retaliation for bodily harm is restricted to those cases
in which exact equality can be assured .... "). The criminal punishments receiving the
most notoriety in the West have been those involving mutilation for theft, usually by the
public amputation of a hand. This horror is prescribed by the Koran, wherein Mohammed
directs his followers to sever the hands of all thieves, regardless of sex, "as an example
from Allah." Sura 5:42. However, this practice is on the decline in most of Islam; only
Saudi Arabia still resorts to it with any frequency. J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 179-80.
" Imprisonment had been used most frequently to punish recalcitrant thievery. J.
SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 180. The absence of a corrective imprisonment penology in Islam
may account partially for the poor prison conditions often found in Arab states. See notes
115-128 infra and accompanying text.
,I See generally I. GOLDZIHER, ISLAM, 101-12 (1967).
41 Id.
,3 Sura 47:4.
, See 11 KITAB-AL-AGHANI 79 (1285 A.H.); F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 38-9; R. LEVY, supra
note 12, at 73-85 (an interesting sociological depiction of Islamic slavery); J. SCHACHT, supra
note 6, at 127-30 (a legal analysis).
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jahiliyah ("injustice"). Islamic history provides numerous examples
of black men who became noted members of the ummah." Con-
flicts which may appear to be based upon racism are better ex-
plained as sectarian or territorial disputes."
Gender-based discrimination abounds in traditional Islamic
society." Until recently, all Islamic women had little choice but
to accept of the role of marriage and child care; they were denied
political participation and independent employment. 7 Moderniza-
tion and increasing world attention on sociopolitical discrimination
against women" have combined to instigate some liberalization
throughout the Middle East.9 In many conservative societies,
polifical and economic opportunities are becoming available to
women due to a more liberal ijm!, though Shari'a restraints have
not been abolished completely. 50 The women still face limited educa-
tional opportunities and restrictions on travel and dress, and have
few legal rights apart from those derived from their married status.
In more liberal societies, governments have abolished Shari'a con-
- See R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 85-87.
'5See A. KAMIL, ISLAM AND THE RACE QUESTION 46-50 (1970); R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 61-64.
It is generally conceded that harsh sexual discrimination was derived from pre-Islamic
tribal mores; it did not originate with jShar 'a. See generally R. LEVY, supra note 12, at
91-134; W. SMITH, KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN EARLY ARABIA (1885).
," However, women were granted equality in property rights, and some were able to
become noted scholars and saints. See I. GOLDZIHER, MOHAMMEDANISCHE STUDIEN 300 (1890);
R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 132-35; F. RAHMAN, supra note 7, at 38; J. SCHACHT, supra note
6, at 126-27; M. SMITH, RABrA THE MYSTIC AND HER FELLOW-SAINTS IN ISLAM 3 (1928); An-
toun, On the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim Villages: A Study in the Accomodation of
Traditions, 70 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 761 (1968); Drower, Women and Taboo in Iraq, 5 IRAQ
105 (1938); Lutfiyya, Islam and Village Culture, in READINGS IN ARAB MIDDLE EASTERN
SOCIETIES AND CULTURES 44 (A. Lutfiyya & C. Churchill eds. 1970); Mohsen, The Legal Status
of Women Among Awad'Ali, 40 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 153 (1967); M. el-Sanabary, A Com-
parative Study of the Disparities of Educational Opportunity for Girls in the Arab States
(1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley).
'5 See, e.g., Legal Capacity of Married Women: Capacity to Engage in Independent Work,
Progress Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/384 (1973).
, See generally Anderson, Reforms in the Law of Divorce in the Muslim World, 31 STUDIA
ISLAMICA 41 (1970); Dodd, Youth and Women's Emancipation in the United Arab Republic, 20
MIDDLE EAST J. 159 (1968); Hamamsy, The Changing Role of the Egyptian Woman, in READINGS
IN ARAB MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES AND CULTURES 592 (1970); Melconian, Arab Women: In
Hot Pursuit of a Feminist Oriented Economy, THE ARAB ECONOMIST, August, 1975, at 18;
Nelson, Changing Roles of Men and Women: Illustrations from Egypt, 41 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
Q. 56 (1968); Nelson, Public and Private Politics: Women in the Middle Eastern World, 1
AM. ETHNOLOGIST 551 (1974); Parssinen, The Changing Role of Women, in KING FAISAL AND THE
MODERNIZATION OF SAUDI ARABIA 145 (W. Beling ed. 1973); M. el-Sanabary, The Education of
Women in the Arab States: Achievements and Problems, 1950-70 (paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Nov. 6-9, 1974).
For example, in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, restrictions are placed on females traveling
without male companions. See notes 225 and 226 infra and accompanying text.
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cepts in an effort to promote total equality under law.
3. Shari'a Economics
In the economics of traditional Islam, moderation is the norm."
The believer is to shun great riches, as they offer enticement to
sin,' but poverty is also to be avoided, as it leads to unbelief.'
The wise Moslem is one who works for financial sufficiency, not
riches, leaving his spiritual progress unimpeded. Only the essen-
tials of life are to be desired; everything else comes wholly through
the Divine Will.' There is no private ownership in traditional Islam,
as all property belongs to Allah who, in turn, allows believers a
"right of use" in material things." It is the duty of the Islamic
state to regulate this "right of use," and to provide from state
revenues the material essentials of life for needy Moslems.57
Islamic inheritance laws have furthered a more equitable and
moderate method for distribution of wealth by abolishing the rule
of primogeniture whereby the eldest son inherited the entire
estate. Shari'a also provides that the husband or wife is always
an heir; females and cognates are competent to inherit (normally,
females are given half the share of males); and parents and ascend-
ants are given the right to inherit even when there are male
descendants.' These provisions vary markedly from the pre-Islamic
" E.g., Egypt and Iraq. See notes 240 and 248 infra and accompanying text.
' In the Koran Allah declares, "[W]e have made you a people with moderate virtues
in order that you may be a witness to men." Sura 2:143. See generally, M. ABDUL-RAUF,
THE ISLAMIC DOCTRINE OF ECONOMICS AND CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1979); F.
HASSAN, supra note 4, at 177-91; M. RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM (1973) (an extensive
analysis of traditional and contemporary Islamic economics).
' See Said, supra note 5, at 90.
Id. Compare the following thought by Hassan:
The purpose of the Quranic Social Order, then, is to ensure for every individual
the provision of the basic necessities of life so that he may be free to devote
himself to the development of his personality in that social order. If, despite this
promise, and after fulfilling the ordained requirements, people are hungry, then
it is a Muslim's belief that, too, is God's will. He alone knows the mysteries of
the universe, and the believer has simply to submit himself to His Wisdom and
System.
F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 170.
11,F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 170.
Id. at 186-87 (regarding agricultural lands). See also, Said, supra note 5, at 90.
"T Traditional Islam provided for an annual zakat, or two and one-half percent alms tax
on all property, the revenues of which were to aid the poor. With the rise of the Ottoman
Empire in the sixteenth century, the systematic collection of the tax ceased, and the zakat
became a voluntary form of private charity. See F. HASSAN, supra note 4, at 177-85.
s' J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 170-72.
" Id. at 169-71. See also Sura 4:3-4, 12-14.
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practices of the Arab tribes, and they have helped to make land
reform a meaningful possibility.6°
4. Legal Reform
Throughout its history, Shari'a has been characterized by its
capacity for adaptation to a wide variety of cultural and political
changes." The ulama must either make the law meet modern con-
ditions or lose what influence they have and be supplanted by
Westernized codes.
Cultural development and Western legal influences have caused
a rift between Shari'a doctrine and modern Islamic social life,
leading to an acute struggle between the legal ideal and the social
reality.62 Kiyas, the construction and application of the Koran and
sunna, has become a vehicle for maintaining the modern relevan-
cy of Shar*'a. In particular, two principles of kiyais have gained
importance: maslaha ("public interest") and 'illa ("cause").
The first principle, maslaha, enables the ulama, the "learned
ones", to establish rules based on the "public interest" or "general
good" of the society.63 Thus, Shari'a provisions can be conformed
to social conditions without violating the Koranic mandates. By
using maslaha, modern jurists have been able to borrow from both
Islamic and Western sources to produce administrative and com-
mercial reforms for Middle Eastern states." If this same principle
could be employed in the consideration of human rights issues,
the traditional Islamic antipathy toward Western social standards
might be overcome.
The second principle, 'illa, rests on the idea that every social
regulation must be the result of a "cause" or condition which makes
w The unwritten laws of urf, or "what is commonly known and practiced," and ada, or
"custom," often prove stronger than Shar{'a mandates, especially among tribal bedouin.
See R. LEVY, supra note 12, at 245-49; J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 77-85.
" See generally Yamani, supra note 7 (an interesting claim for the continued relevance
of Shari'a by the Saudi oil minister).
", Note, Traditionalism and Modernism in Islamic Law: A Review, 11 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 491 (1972).
Though the legal ideal has been retained more dogmatically in family law and
the law of inheritance, even here it is losing force and is under constant pressure
to readjust. In administrative, civil, commercial, and criminal law the practical
necessities have dominated legal reform and the ideal remains largely in general
principles.
Id. at 495.
Khadduri, supra note 7, at 214.
See N. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (1976) and J. SCHACHT, supra note
6, at 100-11 for surveys of modernist legislation and its impact on traditional legal standards.
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the regulation necessary or desirable." Thus, 'illa, with its doc-
trinal mandate to keep abreast of social progress, is another poten-
tially powerful element of Shari'a which could have many applica-
tions in the improvement of Arab human rights practices.
B. Praetorianism and the Middle-Class Revolution
Praetorianism, the intervention of the military in politics,
describes the role of Islamic armed forces in most Middle Eastern
states.6 Unlike Western democracies, Islam has never separated
military and State. Historically, Islamic tribal leaders used armed
force to extend their rule over other tribal groups. Once an Islamic
empire grew too large to be defended personally by the ruler, it
was divided into military districts and governed by mercenary
officers."7
. Military intervention is deployed often throughout the world to
defend a conservative status quo threatened by radical sociopolitical
change. In the Islamic world, however, armed forces have become
the protectors of progressive rather than conservative interests.
Military forces often take the initiative in deposing traditional
governments in favor of populist regimes espousing reform." One
reason for such a unique tradition may be the result of the use
of European military officers in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies to instruct and lead Moslem troops. These foreign officers
brought with them the prevalent liberal European philosophies.
Thus, the military became a seedbed for democratic and other
Western ideas at the very time the ulama and Islamic educators
were condemning Westernism.6 9
The collapse of Ottoman rule in 1918 and the subsequent parti-
tion of the region resulted in a number of traditional-conservative
65 Khadduri, supra note 7, at 215. There is a saying attributed to the al-Imam al-Shafti
which states, "Change of law because of change of circumstance cannot be denied." See
Yamani, supra note 7, at 207.
" See S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 195 (1968). See generally A.
PERLMUTTER, EGYPT: THE PRAETORIAN STATE (1974).
'7 Within two centuries after the Prophet's death, mercenaries held all but titular power
in the Baghdad kaliphate (ca. 830 A.D.). A similar state of affairs was to persist in all Islamic
monarchies for more than a millenium. M. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 251-52.
" Id. at 253. See generally E. BE'ERI, ARMY OFFICERS IN ARAB POLITICS AND SOCIETY 275-86
(1970); J. HUREWITZ, MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION 28-46 (1969); H. SHARABI,
NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD (1966); Bill, The Military and Moderniza-
tion in the Middle East, 2 COMP. POL. 41 (1969); Perlmutter, The Arab Military Elite, 22 WORLD
POL. 269 (1970).
66 M. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 257-61.
[Vol. 12:55
SHARI'A LAW
monarchies, the kings of which were chosen more for their
allegiance to London or Paris than for their popular legitimacy.
These new nations were led in some instances by monarchs who
had tremendous difficulty in legitimating their governments while
their colonial subservience, political corruption, and administrative
ineptitude prevailed. Such dynasties alienated the devout by fail-
ing to comply with Shar'a standards of justice and morality. The
ulama gradually withdrew their bureaucratic support from these
regimes, and the kings became more dependent on European ad-
visors. Similarly, an emerging middle-class of merchants, profes-
sionals, and military officers was alienated by the monarchs' cor-
ruption and socioeconomic immobilism. 0
The defeats of the first Palestinian War in 1948 stimulated an
intense political reappraisal which led to the first reformist coups
in the Middle East. The Egyptian coup of 1952 set the style for
succeeding praetorian-populist regimes in the region, as the tradi-
tional political establishments faced a new kind of opposition. The
adversaries were not petty court or tribal intrigues, but politicized
civilian groups which formed parties and gained the support of
responsible military forces."
The stage was set for radical change. The middle-classes, learn-
ing from foreign commercial and intellectual contacts, continued
to expand and consolidate their socioeconomic gains. Traditional
groups within these classes, such as religious brotherhoods, labor
guilds, and social clubs, refused to be co-opted or suppressed by
the ruling governments. They began to assert the middle-class in-
terests of their members: popular political participation, economic
growth, freedom from neo-colonial trade restrictions, and social
redistribution through effective land reforms.72 These demands
bespoke a class interest beyond national independence and self-
determination. Middle-class intellectuals became the purveyors of
Western rationalism and scientific socialism.3
The military was the group best suited to initiate progressive
social change due to its extended exposure to Western ideas; long
experience with monarchial governments; well-established admin-
istrative and security forces; and socially and geographically
" Id. at 51-78. But see Perlmutter, Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A Com-
parative Analysis, 10 COMP. STUD. IN SOCy! & HIST. 46 (1967).
1 M. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 252. See also, Bill, supra note 68, at 41; Perlmutter, supra
note 66, at 269.
" M. HALPERN, supra note 26, at 61-62.
Id. at 56-61.
19821
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
representative character. The background of the majority of of-
ficers was that of the dynamic and progressive middle-class, whose
beliefs became the sociopolitical programs advanced by
praetorianism
As these nations began to undergo a series of revolutionary in-
ternal changes, a dominating social trend developed, significantly
affecting human rights practices. Praetorian populism, in its ef-
fort to transform both State and Man, swept away many of the
traditional Shari'a values and social, political, and legal institu-
tions which had united the old culture. Members of the old tribal
aristocracies, and the peasants and bedouins who comprised a ma-
jority in every nation, did not subscribe readily to the new secular
values. As these non-ruling class members distrusted the new
governments, the populists were forced to speak in traditional
terms, making frequent references to Arab unity (strongly reminis-
cent of similar Koranic proclamations), national heritage, holy war
(the liberation of Palestine), and social justice. In some cases, pro-
gressive populist governments were forced to recognize traditional
authority figures among the clergy, ulama, and tribal leaders, as
to ignore or suppress them meant to risk the loss of any legitimacy
the new regimes possessed at their outset.
As a result of tolerating such traditional authority figures,
parallel power structures were established in most populist
societies. The formal state power was wielded by the military, which
purported to rule for Allah and the people. Yet, a measure of power
was retained by religious and tribal leaders, who held the allegiance
of those disappointed in the new systems and those who had op-
posed them from their inception. The secularized populist regimes
relied on the support of the urban dwellers, many of whom were
middle-class, as they were not wholly successful in winning
legitimacy in the eyes of rural peasants and bedouin who feared
many of the sociopolitical changes."5
Within the middle-class, there were further ideological divisions.
Professionals and merchants often wanted moderate governments,
with state subsidization of industry and education, expansion of
foreign trade, and land reforms to increase domestic food produc-
tion. Their views were not far removed from those of European
social democracy in which an emphasis is placed on state service
to the individual, albeit somewhat paternalistic in nature. They
' Id. at 257-61.
75 See A. MALEK, EGYPT: MILITARY SOCIETY 372-87 (1968).
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stressed some aspects of Koranic government, such as social justice,
legal rectitude, and political respect for the individual citizen, but
desired modern political and legal improvements.76
Another middle-class view emphasized the concentration of state
power in the hands of a political elite. This concept prevailed among
elements of the intellectual elite and was especially popular among
the military, who desired national modernization over social equal-
ity. Under this view, the intelligentsia formulated, the military per-
sonified, and the bureaucracy implemented policies designed to pro-
mote industrial development, agricultural sufficiency, social welfare,
and national prestige. Individuals and communal groups were forced
to serve the State, thus progressive ideology emphasized tradi-
tional concepts subordinating individual autonomy to the will of
the community.77
Those emphasizing state power quickly rose to leadership in the
various populist states. The governmental institutions they initiated
were secular, authoritarian, and bureaucratic, with militarized
political parties. Political moderates often possessed only titular
authority without power, or were omitted from the new govern-
ments altogether.78
A combination of factors appears to have ensured the success
of authoritarianism over moderate social democracy. First, parlia-
mentary governments under traditional monarchs had never been
more than pawns, never legislating effectively to meet the needs
of the people. Therefore, parliaments were viewed as a part of
the problem of traditionalism, not a potential answer to its abuses.79
Second, authoritarianism was seen as a form of government or-
dained by Allah, as He had historically blessed rulers who iden-
tified themselves with the customs, mores, and needs of the
governed. Liberal parliamentary government was viewed as a weak
system wherein no one could be held responsible for the enforce-
ment of traditional standards.' Third, democracy was the prac-
tice of imperialist nations, which the authoritarians had always
implicated in the wrong-doings of the monarchies. Finally, the
authoritarians were better prepared than their liberal opponents.
76 See Halpern, Egypt and the New Middle Class: Reaffirmations and New Explorations,
11 COMP. STUD. IN SOC'Y & HIST. 97 (1969).
17 See part II. A.2. supra at pp. 61-64.
78 See P. VATIKIOTIS, NASSER AND HIs GENERATION 126-37 (1978).
j. BILL & C. LEIDEN, POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 26-27 (1979).
'0 The parliaments promoted "underrepresentation, pseudo-representation, and
misrepresentation." Id. at 27.
19821
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Their military leadership and administrative expertise enabled
them to seize and retain the political initiative in every Arab state
undergoing a populist revolution."'
From a human rights standpoint, praetorian-populist regimes
have subscribed to the same basic formula which enabled tradi-
tional goverments to rule: (1) maintain the intercourse of govern-
ment, commerce, and religion; (2) continue the moral rapport with
the community, which provides the political power base, by ex-
pressing values congruent with theirs; (3) erect a loyal bureaucracy;
and (4) tap the individual Moslem's desire to see himself as a
member of a purposeful group committed to a common effort of
historic proportions.' Traditional concepts of authoritarianism have
hindered the modern populist governments in any attempts to
enlarge the sphere of individual rights. Consequently, except for
those who work directly for the government, social, economic, and
political rights have progressed slowly for the common Moslem.'
C. Religious versus Secular Authority
Under different circumstances, the ulama might have provided
the moral counterweight needed to balance civil liberties and
political power in the traditional Arab states. They were the
keepers and diviners of the oracles of Allah; they were of the com-
mon social stock, not from the tribal aristocracies; and although
other areas of law modernized too quickly to remain within their
grasp, they had frequently shown great ingenuity in utilizing
maslaha and 'illa to maintain their jurisdiction over socioeconomic
matters in the face of sudden change.
Historically, the ulama have been unable to oppose the military
rulers successfully." Early doctrine provided that all Moslems were
able to determine for themselves the mysteries of the Divine Will.
However, in the tenth century, competition among opposing clans
and rulers, each claiming Allah's blessing, forced the ulama to "close
the gate" to individual interpretation of Shari'a.s5 This prohibition
11 See generally Lenczowski, Democracy, Development, and Political Integration in the Arab
World: A Search for a Comprehensive Formula, in THE CONFLICT OF TRADITIONALISM AND
MODERNISM IN THE MUSLIM MIDDLE EAST 61 (G. Leiden ed. 1966).
Compare these criteria for political legitimacy with those of traditional Islam. See part
II. A supra at pp. 56-66.
E.g., Iraqi sociopolitical mobility is determined largely by whether one is a member
of the Ba'th Party. See part III. C.3.b. infra at pp. 88-89.




provoked a period of bloody reprisals as clans and leaders turned
to self-help to settle their grievances.' Because this social unrest
threatened to destroy order in the kaliphate, the religious and
secular authorities joined forces in an effort to save the socio-
political system, despite their differing values. 7
By this marriage of convenience, the secular rulers reestablished
an ideological justification for their authority. The ulama became
the official ideologues of the State, countering the factious religious
and political inclinations of the common people. Admission to the
ranks of the ulama came to be based predominantly on heredity.
In short, the ulama became co-opted by the same sociopolitical
establishment which opposed their spiritual and ethical principles."M
This co-optive relationship between the ulama and government
continues. The decline of formal Shari'a authority in many spheres
of Islamic jurisprudence has diminished the legal role of the ulama.
Since the nineteenth century, many of these scholars have retreated
to their seminaries and mosques to study and lecture, no longer
needed by secularized governments. Yet, as the current Islamic
revival illustrates, the ulama can still play an influential role in
defining acceptable social mores and bestowing or withholding
governmental legitimacy."
III. VARIED MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SHARI'A TRADITION
A. Traditional-Conservative States"
Traditional-conservative states continue to base their
sociopolitical conduct on Shari'a religious and communal principles,
as their raison d'etre is the preservation of Koranic faith and
society."' They exhibit a willingness to accept socioeconomic pro-
gress, but only if such modernization can be controlled so that it
does not threaten the traditional foundations of society and politics.
Saudi Arabia is the purest example of a society in which Shar 'a
values have remained relatively unchanged despite notable
MId. at 16.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 16-18. However, the ulama were able to "modify" the exercise of government
authority. Id. at 19.
See Bayat, Islam in Pahlavi and Post-Pahlavi Iran: A Cultural Revolution?, in ISLAM
AND DEVELOPMENT: RELIGION AND SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE 87 (J. Esposito ed. 1980).
" See note 1, supra.
" Most of these states have expressly incorporated large portions of Shar 'a into their
national constitutions, and retain a system of k6dis' courts to administer traditional law
on a voluntary basis in certain types of cases.
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socioeconomic progress. Viewing the Koran as its only constitu-
tion, the Saudi nation relies upon its religious and tribal institu-
tions to define and regulate the relationship between Man and
State.92 Jordan, on the other hand, has adopted a more moderate
approach to national development. Shari'a values are implemented
through modern governmental institutions and procedures which
correct some of the abuses and inadequacies inherent in the tradi-
tional concept of human rights.93
B. Praetorian-Populist States94
Whereas traditional-conservative states protect the integrity of
communal groups, praetorian-populist states express the interests
of associational groups. Often heedless of tradition, these states
press for socioeconomic development with popular participation
in the process of nation-building. There is a profound redefinition
of the traditional Islamic view of Man and State. 5 A pervasive
one-party or militaristic political order is erected, and a strong
leader personifies the national ideology. Egypt has combined con-
stitutionally the principles of Shari'a with a complete restructur-
ing of society and politics along the lines of Arab socialism. They
seek to achieve social justice and equality by scientific rationalism
and state planning." Iraq, while declaring itself an "Islamic State,"
has attempted a more radical sociopolitical transformation, com-
bining socialism, rationalism, and state planning with the most per-
vasive authoritarianism in the region.97
C. Comparing Human Rights Practices
As many legal factors affect the overall quality of life in any
given society, this comparative survey is not limited to an examina-
tion of factors affecting political liberties. 8 In its annual Country
' See Rentz, The Saudi Monarchy, in KING FAISAL AND THE MODERNIZATION OF SAUDI
ARABIA 15 (W. Beling ed. 1980).
" See, e.g., Law No. 78 (1952) (Jordan).
" See note 1, supra.
"3 The substantive redefinition supplants the traditional allegiance to clan and communal
group with state nationalism. See H. SHARABI, NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB
WORLD 82-92 (1966).
-See generally A. MALEK, supra note 75, at 320-50.
See generally L. KIMBALL, THE CHANGING PATTERN OF POLITICAL POWER IN IRAQ 105-19
(1972).
" E.g., freedom of speech, press, and assembly. See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL,
& L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1-93 (1980) (a comprehensive discussion
of common demands and deprivations regarding a broad range of factors and consequences).
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Reports on Human Rights Practices, the United States Department
of State employs a set of human rights factors that has been
adapted to the needs of this study. A three-point analysis is used
to set forth governmental policies affecting: (1) Respect for the In-
tegrity of the Person (Torture; Cruel and Inhuman Punishment; Ar-
bitrary Arrest and Imprisonment; Denial of Fair Public Trial; and
Invasion of the Home); (2) Policies Relating to Such Vital Needs as
Food, Shelter, and Education [hereinafter referred to as "Social
Welfare Needs"]; 99 and (3) Respect for Civil and Political Liberties
(Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion, and Assembly; Freedom of
Movement, Travel, and Emigration; and Participation in the
Political Process). From this holistic perspective, one may compare
the degrees to which different Arab states have upheld, modified,
or abolished traditional Shari'a values and institutions, and evaluate
the impact of such policies on human rights.
1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person
a. Torture
Reports of torture in traditional-conservative Arab states are
surprisingly few and understandably difficult to substantiate. It
is surprising that so few allegations of torture in nations such as
Saudi Arabia have been brought to world attention, because several
Western scholars have documented the tribal heritage of tortur-
ing prisoners. Tribal tortures have been inflicted on religious
dissidents, political prisoners, and common criminals alike, despite
Shari'a admonitions for mercy. ' However, international groups
monitoring human rights conduct in the region report no substan-
tiated claims of physical torture in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.1
Whereas Jordanian government spokesmen are fond of repeating
the fact that their Constitution implicitly prohibits torture,' 2 the
Saudi government has made no effort to disprove claims of tor-
ture beyond general denials. 03
" For purposes of this study, the lengthy title of this sphere 6f rights has been shorten-
ed to "Social Welfare Needs."
,'o See A. KHALIFA, FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 115-20 (3d ed. 1952); F. ROSENTHAL, THE
MUSLIM CONCEPT OF FREEDOM PRIOR TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 55-60, 93-95 (1960).
', U.S. DEP"r.oF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1014,1084 (released
1981) [hereinafter cited as 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS].
x" AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 8 (Jordan). This section guarantees "lawful" treatment dur-
ing detention. There is, however, no express constitutional or legal prohibition of torture
in Jordan.
103 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1978 REPORT 270 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 AI REPORT].
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Praetorian-populist states have not exhibited the apparent reluc-
tance to torture that has restrained their traditional-conservative
neighbors. In an environment in which power at the personal level
is more pervasive than that exercised by any Islamic monarch,
internal security forces have violated individual integrity on a
regular basis by torturing alleged perpetrators of "subversion."10 4
Such practices, however, may be the logical result of establishing
police states in societies which never had an accepted tradition
of individual human worth.0 5
The Egyptian Constitution clearly stipulates that prisoners are
to be treated "in such a manner as will preserve human dignity."'"M
President Sadat insisted that his government was in compliance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' and the national
courts have heard cases of alleged torture brought by ex-pris-
oners1TM In addition, information obtained by torture cannot be used
against the party from whom it was coerced, 09 a radical departure
from the common practice under Sadat's predecessor, Nasser.
Yet, allegations of the torture of political prisoners persist.'
The Iraqi regime has a long history of torturing persons sus-
pected of violating national security measures."' Despite the Iraqi
Constitution's explicit prohibition of torture,"' Amnesty Interna-
tional has collected a number of reports alleging the deaths of de-
tainees at the hands of their interrogators." '
b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Shari'a punishments, often brutal by Western standards, are
employed in full by the Saudi judicial system. The result is the
death penalty for those convicted of murder, kidnapping, armed
104 See, e.g., notes 112-14, infra. While the available evidence suggests that Sadat
ameliorated the treatment of political prisoners in Egypt, the Iraqi government has shown
no such improvement.
"' See part II. A. 2 supra at pp. 61-64.
" ALDUSTUR (Constitution) art. 42,-para. 1 (Egypt).
" 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 46-49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
1o8 1980 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 101, at 963.
109 See notes 35-39 supra.
Io See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 206-07 (1973).
I AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1979 REPORT 155 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Al REPORT].
I AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 210-11 (1973).
CONSTITUTION PROvIsoIRE art. 42(a) (Iraq).
li AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1980 REPORT 141 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Al REPORT].
See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IRAQ: EVIDENCE OF TORTURE (1981), which concludes
that torture may be continuing and widespread in Iraq, and that the Iraqi government
has failed to safeguard detainees legally against torture.
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robbery, adultery, or rape."' Recidivist thieves may have their
hands severed, although this practice is no longer common, ' and
public floggings are meted out for a host of petty crimes and mis-
demeanors.' 7 Saudi prison conditions are difficult to ascertain, as
records are inadequate and there is little public access to the
facilities. Amnesty International's requests to inspect prisons and
discuss alternatives to traditional punishments have been met by
silence from King Khalid.'18
The Jordanian government maintains two types of prison
systems: civilian jails and prisons for ordinary offenders, and high-
security detention centers for accused violators of the martial law
provisions in effect since 1973.11'9 Amnesty International reports
numerous human rights violations with regard to the treatment
of political detainees. 20 The Abdeli Security Prison in Amman, a
military compound housing martial law violators,-allegedly contains
punishment cells where uncooperative prisoners may spend weeks
with inadequate water, food, and light. Similar conditions are
reported for the civilian Manhatta Central Prison.2 ' While the Jor-
danian military has exercised sole jurisdiction over all martial law
violations to date, there is some indication that civilian courts may
be willing to limit the absolute power of the military in such
matters." Also, King Hussein has been remarkably cooperative
in submitting information regarding particular cases to various
international agencies. This indicates a sensitivity on his part to
world opinion which could be employed productively whenever
cases can be identified precisely.
Since the liberalizing measures adopted by President Sadat in
the mid-1970s, Egyptian prison conditions have been adequate, with
no reports of institutional mistreatment." President Sadat resisted
J.5 . SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 175-87 (1964). See also notes 35-39, supra, and accompany-
ing text.
1 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1084.
... The floggings are seldom brutal. Id
", See 1978 Al REPORT, supra note 103, at 270 (partial text of the original AI request).
116 U.S. DEPT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 573 (released 1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 COUNTRY REPORTS].
"N See, e.g., 1978 AT REPORT, supra note 103, at 265; 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at
163-64.
11' The amnesty of several political detainees has been granted in recent years. See 1978
COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 119, at 770-71; 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1015.
IN 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1015.
113 Id. at 964.
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repeated attempts to reimpose legislatively Shari'a punishments
for a number of offenses. 4
The Iraqi regime has fourteen preliminary detention and inter-
rogation centers, all of which are quite unsanitary; but better con-
ditions have been reported in the regular prisons. 25 Iraqi political
detainees are held incommunicado by the military throughout their
interrogations, and only afterward may they receive visitors and
food. Executions are routine in many types of security cases, 12 and
there have been reports of the poison deaths of two detainees after
their acquittal and release from custody." Both Amnesty Interna-
tional and the United States Department of State report that hun-
dreds of political prisoners are executed every year. 28 Evidently,
the prospect of civil unrest in Iraq is great enough to have prompt-
ed the ruling junta, which has scorned most traditional indicia
of political legitimacy, to take draconian measures to ensure
domestic cooperation with the government.
c. Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment
Saudi Arabia has no habeas corpus provisions, and unlimited
detention may occur while government prosecutors investigate and
prepare their case against the accused.'" As Shari'a discourages
penal detention, ' petty offenders may be released on bond pend-
ing trial.'' Some persons are detained briefly for security reasons
without facing formal charges, but most are either charged quick-
ly or deported.1" Saudi debtors may be imprisoned without lengthy
formalities, but they are no longer subject to periods of involun-
12' The most persistent efforts have been made by Islamic fundamentalists intent on
reimposing the death penalty for Moslems who convert to Christianity. 1978 AI REPORT,
supra note 103, at 253.
1 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 986.
126 Id.
127 Id.
,,8 1979 AI REPORT, supra note 111, at 159-60. Accord, 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note
101, at 986.
129 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1085.
" See note 39, supra, and accompanying text.
231 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1085.
In 1979, religious zealots stormed the Mosque in Mecca and incited a rebellion among
tribesmen in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The government responded to the
crisis with a wave of arrests, culminating in the beheading of sixty-nine rebel leaders. Shari'a
hearings were granted to hundreds of detainees in a lengthy determination of responsibil-
ity for the affair, indicating, no doubt, a sensitivity to worldwide attention to the tense
situation. Id.
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tary servitude in payment of their debts. ' An interesting Saudi
institution is the number of benevolent societies organized to pay
a debtor's obligations to obtain his release from prison. This prac-
tice manifests the Koranic emphasis on alms-giving and forgiveness
of debts."M
Under Jordanian law, martial law detainees may petition the
High Court of Justice for review of the legality of their continued
confinement; otherwise, they may face unlimited detention without
trial.3 5 The High Court recently has overturned several martial
law convictions on the ground that the accused actually did nothing
which threatened national security. King Hussein has granted
amnesty to hundreds of political prisoners since 1973, many of whom
had been held without trial. Although the government announced
in 1979 that it no longer held political prisoners, meaning those
held without trial, it acknowledged that many were still serving
sentences for "subversion." '
Throughout most of his tenure, Egyptian President Sadat ruled
under State of Emergency provisions which provide for special
security measures in arrests, detentions, interrogations, and other
police functions. Generally, habeas corpus is respected in Egyptian
courts, but Sadat invoked a number of laws which gave him the
power to refer certain cases to special security tribunals for in
camera proceedings. From these courts, there is no appeal except
to the President. 7 Sadat also claimed the power to ratify the deci-
sions of security tribunals, in one case causing the retrial of nine-
teen suspects after their initial acquittal." Arrests for illegal party
membership, unfavorable press reports, and the mere suspicion
of Communist affiliation'39 are rather frequent, although suspects
are charged promptly or released. 4" Recently, the Egyptian Bar
" Classical Shar?'a prescribes the imprisonment of an allegedly impoverished debtor
until the kdi is convinced that he would pay if he could. J. SCHACHT, supra note 6, at 197-98.
134 U.S. DEP~t OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1085 (released 1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 COUNTRY REPORTS].
"s 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1015.
' 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at 165.
"a 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 964.
' 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at 154-55.
In September, 1981, Sadat ordered the arrest of over 1800 members of the political
opposition for allegedly conspiring with Communist elements to overthrow the govern-
ment. The opposition media was silenced, and foreign correspondents who had been critical
of the government were expelled from Egypt. At this writing, the long-term effect of these
actions on domestic political dissent is unclear. Evidently, such measures may have set
the stage for Sadat's assassination by fanatical Moslems on October 6, 1981.
1,o 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 964.
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Association has become assertive in protecting the procedural
rights of political defendants at both the pre-trial and trial stages
of detention.""
In Iraq, there are frequent arrests and detentions for "suspi-
cion" of seditious sentiments or activity."2 If political charges are
formalized for trial, they usually fall into two broad categories:
"treason" or "affiliation with an illegal party."1" Entire professional
groups and ethnic communities have been subjected to sweeping
arrests, especially Freemasons (active among older urban profes-
sionals) and Kurdish tribesmen in the northeast.'" Due to pressure
from Western Europe and Amnesty International, the Baghdad
regime declared amnesties during 1978 for Iraqi political prisoners,
and during 1979 for the Kurds. "5
d. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Traditionally, trials under Shari'a are public, and the accused
is given the right to speak on his own behalf, call witnesses, and
cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary. There are no at-
torneys in the Western sense, but an impartial k~idi is charged
with questioning each party and applying the law." 6
In Saudi Arabia, both parties may receive a court-appointed
counselor for assistance in preparing their case, and interpreters
are provided for those who do not speak Arabic. "7 All trials are
public, except those of cases involving state security issues.'" Saudi
kdis hear two types of actions: (1) Public Right, usually a criminal
action prosecuted by the government, and (2) Private Right, a civil
action seeking individual redress. Matters involving both types of
actions commonly are decided in the same trial.
11 See AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 173 (Egypt). See generally F. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE
RULE OF LAW AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT (1968).
,a 1978 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 119, at 750.
Rudolph, National Security, in IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 223,254-57 (3d ed. R. Nyrop 1979).
'" Thousands of Kurds have been removed forcibly from their ancestral lands and sent
to government resettlement areas away from sensitive border regions. E. GHAREEB, THE
KURDISH QUESTIONS IN IRAQ 176-77 (1981).
1 1978 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 119, at 750. There are, however, recent reports of
new mass arrests of clandestine Christian groups and Iraqi Communists for alleged secur-
ity violations. See 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at 158-61.
1" Baroody, The Practice of Law in Saudi Arabia, in KING FAISAL AND THE MODERNIZA-
TION OF SAUDI ARABIA 113, 116 (W. Belin) ed. 1980); Wormser, The Legal System of Islam, 64
A.B.A. J. 1359, 1361 (1978)
147 However, these counselors are not legal "advocates" in the Anglo-American sense.
148 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1085. (E.g., the 1976 trial of King Faisal's
assassin and narcotics matters).
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Courts of first instance are the Summary and General courts,
which most often employ a single k2di. Matters involving severe
punishment or the possibility of a death sentence can be heard
only in a General Court before three kdis. An Appellate Court
is composed of a chief kddi assisted by three to five others, depend-
ing on the seriousness of the case. The Supreme Judicial Council
is composed of eleven ulama, and serves the dual roles of advising
the government on all legal matters and providing final review of all
severe punishments and death sentences imposed.4 9 The King
himself retains plenary pardon power in all cases, criminal and
civil. The military judiciary assumes jurisdiction over all criminal
actions involving military affairs, including those in which the defen-
dant is a civilian. However, appeals from military courts may be
made through the civilian appellate process. 50
Jordanian martial law tribunals are not required to protect the
procedural rights of defendants, although rights to counsel and
cross-examination are evidently honored.' 1 The martial law courts
assume absolute jurisdiction over cases involving espionage, bribery
of officials, narcotics trafficking, black marketeering, and illegal
weapons sales.5 2 Although there are no appeals from the martial
law courts, the prime minister must review each sentence in his
capacity as martial law governor, and he may reduce, alter, or an-
nul the sentence as he sees fit."s
In civilian cases, all arrests must be reviewed by the Public Pros-
ecutor's Office within twenty-four hours, and the matter turned
over to the Attorney General for prosecution.' The defendant is
entitled to legal counsel, and the National Bar Association will pro-
vide counsel for indigent defendants. 5' There is no established ap-
pellate process for felony convictions except direct appeal to the
King. A separate system of kVdis' courts is maintained for Moslems
who desire this means of adjudicating property and family issues.1
Egyptian security trials are held usually in camera and without
',' See Baroody, supra note 146, at 123-24.
,s "There is automatic appellate review for military court martials by the Minister of
Defense and the King." 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1085.




" "Many defendants are unaware of this right and fail to exercise it." These lawyers
are trained in advocacy, which is a modern departure from Shari'a tradition. Id.
'6 AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) arts. 105, 106 (Egypt).
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the procedural rights attending ordinary cases.' One right afforded
security defendants is the right to counsel, and the security
tribunals will appoint counsel if necessary." The Egyptian Bar
Association has been active in defending prisoners' procedural
rights, insisting in one case that the government reduce the cost
of reproducing an 11,000-page investigation dossier and grant more
time for its study by defense counsel prior to trial.' 9 The Egyp-
tian Constitution incorporates the basic principles of Shar'a, °
although there is no separate system of kidis' courts. A Court of
Cassation exists, with six appellate chambers and courts of first
instance. A Special Judicial Council is appointed by the President
to ensure the independence of the judiciary from undue political
influence, reflecting the Shari'a standard of impartial justice."'
The structure of the Iraqi court system is almost identical to
that of Egypt, but separate Shari'a courts are allowed to adjudicate
religious and family matters if both parties agree to be bound by
the kE6di's decision. Revolutionary tribunals inaugurated in 1965
to try matters relating to state security have been used increas-
ingly since 1975. All proceedings before these courts are in camera,
and all attorneys are court employees.8 '
e. Invasion of the Home
Traditional Islamic culture has recognized the home as a haven,
inviolable by those outside the clan."M Both Saudi Arabia and Jor-
dan require search warrants before a dwelling can be searched
by police. Although such incidents were once uncommon,'" the
United States Department of State reports frequent searches con-
ducted by the Saudi government in residences of foreigners, osten-
sibly to look for "alcohol, drugs, and pornography."'15
Egyptian law also requires the judiciary to issue a search war-
"' 1980 Al REPORT, supra note 114, at 326-27. 1979 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 134, at
732; accord, 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 964.
1 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at 155.
159 Id.
" "The principles of Islamic Shari'a are primary sources of legislation." AILDuSTUR (Con-
stitution) art. 2 (Egypt).
" AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 173 (Egypt). See generally F. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE RULE
OF LAW. AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT (1968).
"' 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 986-87.
16 However, at least one sociologist has commented on the notable lack of privacy in
Arab society. S. HAMADY, TEMPERAMENT AND CHARACTER OF THE ARABS 32-33 (1960).




rant before any home can be entered legally by the police. 6 ' The
Iraqi government, however, routinely practices unwarranted search-
es in security matters, especially in cases regarding the Kurdish
rebellion."7
2. Social Welfare Needs"
Saudi Arabia has used its petrochemical wealth to provide free
health services and free education, with subsidies for housing, food,
and collegiate studies.69 However, much of this assistance has been
concentrated around the cities of Riyadh, Jiddah, Mecca, and
Medina, with little "trickle-down effect" to the benefit of bedouins
and rural peasants. 7 ' Saudi women are allowed to work in govern-
ment clinics and schools, but Shari'a traditions limit their participa-
tion in other kinds of employment.17" ' Social friction is caused by
thousands of immigrant workers who crowd into Saudi Arabia,
'" AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 44 (Egypt) guarantees against unwarranted invasions of
the home.
", CONSTITUTION PROVISOIRE art. 22(c) (Iraq) states: "Homes have their sanctity. It is inad-
missible to enter or search them, except in accordance with the rules of the law." The
latest series of violations in this area of human rights have involved Iraqi and foreign
Christians holding worship services in private homes. Amnesty International estimates
that over 600 Christians may have been arrested for a variety of alleged offenses, some
being sentenced to as many as five years of imprisonment. Three reasons have been ad-
vanced to explain such arrests, because detention on purely religious grounds is rare in
Islamic society:
(1) the Iraqi worshipers failed to obtain government permission to hold meetings
in their homes;
(2) the Baghdad authorities suspected the Christians and their foreign friends
of conducting "subversive" activities; and
(3) the groups were outside the mainstream of the Iraqi Christian community,
and many members of an Assyrian faction had traditionally favored regional
autonomy.
1979 AI REPORT, supra note 111, at 158-59.
"' See note 99 supra.
'"See R. NYROP, B. BENDERLY, L. CARTER, D. EGLIN & R. KIRCHNER, AREA HANDBOOK FOR
SAUDI ARABIA 86-89 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA]; .SAUDI
ARABIAN CENTRAL PLANNING ORG., DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1395-1400 (1975-80), reprinted in THE
NAT'L TECH. INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PB 246, 572.
' See generally A. Kantanani, Policies and Models for Planning the Economic Develop-
ment of the Non-Oil Sector in Saudi Arabia (1971) (Ph.D. dissertation in the Economics
Dept., Iowa State University). Contra, 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1086-87
(reporting that lower income brackets have been raised significantly due to increased
petroleum revenues).
"I AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA, supra note 169, at 101,154,195,198,236. See generally
A. Alaki, Industrial-Vocational Education in Saudi Arabia: Problems and Prospects (1972)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Business Administration Dep't, University of Arizona).
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preempting native employment in both professional services and
manual labor."'
Jordanian society was affected adversely by Israel's occupation
of the West Bank in 1967. Jordan's most fertile and productive
region was taken, and almost a half million refugees were sent
into the Jordanian interior, a land already poor in natural resources.
Thus, Jordan, formerly self-sufficient, has been forced into
dependence on foreign aid to feed its populace.173 King Hussein's
primary goals have been the elimination of hunger and the provi-
sion of education through the eighth-grade level."4 Another con-
cern has been the emigration of thousands of Jordanian workers
and professionals, often to the Persian Gulf States where salaries
are much higher. 5 With the creation of a special Department of
Women's Affairs in 1976, Hussein hoped to rely on Jordanian
women as a new source of workers and professionals. Some im-
portant results have been obtained. Women now hold several posts
in the bureaucracy, police, and armed forces, and over eighty per-
cent of Jordanian women are enrolled in government educational
programs.'76
In Egypt, Nasser's centralized state planning and resultant Five-
Year Plans enjoyed mixed success in terms of meeting social
welfare needs. Rural education and health care, almost nonexis-
" AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA, supra note 169, at 145-46. See generally Sayigh, Prob-
lems and Prospects of Development in the Arabian Peninsula, in THE ARABIAN PENINSULA:
SOCIETY AND POLITICS 286 (D. Hopwood ed. 1972).
" See Eglin, The Economy, in JORDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 108-10, 14447 (R. Nyrop ed. 1980).
See generally CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN, SEVENTEENTH-ANNUAL REPORT, 1980 (1981); DEP'T
OF STATISTICS, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICAL YEARBOOK AND AGRICULTURAL SAMPLE SURVEY, 1978
(1979); M. MAZIR, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN JORDAN (1979); Y. SAYIGH, THE
DETERMINANTS OF ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1978); U.S. EMBASSY IN AMMAN, ANNUAL
ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORT-JORDAN (U.S. Dep't of State Air-gram A-22) (May 29, 1979).
... Jordan had progressed from twenty-five religious schools in 1925 to more than 2,400
schools at present. Over 625,000 students are enrolled in the state education system, which
involves nearly one-third the national population as teachers or students. In 1979, nearly
97% of Jordan's six to twelve-year-olds were in primary programs, nearly 82% of the twelve
to fifteen-year-olds were in preparatory programs, and 58% of the fifteen to eighteen-year-
olds were in secondary schools. 90% of the ten to fifteen-year-olds were literate, with adult
literacy estimated at over 60%. Government schools and those operated in refugee camps
by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency are free. Subsidized by the Hussein govern-
ment, a significant number of Jordanians obtain university degrees from foreign institu-
tions. See Kaplan, The Society and Its Environment, in JORDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 53,96-102
(R. Nyrop ed. 1980).
IT Eglin, supra note 173, at 112-13.
'e Id. at 112, 127, 164, 209, 226-27.
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tant before 1952, improved dramatically. 7 ' However, private
economic incentives never developed due to state-imposed restric-
tions on income and private enterprise. ' It remained for Anwar
Sadat to loosen the restrictions of state planning which had stifl-
ed the private sector of Egypt's economy. His "open door" policy,
begun in 1974, featured a series of private incentives designed to
boost agricultural production and channel more currency to the
middle-classes. 7 ' However, United States analysts believe that the
classes which have benefited most from these incentives have been
the professionals and commercial "middle men" who have raised
their prices in order to capture the increased money supply. ' For
this and related reasons, Sadat maintained a strict series of wage
and price controls. Free health and educational services are now
available even in the remotest areas, and two billion dollars have
been spent to subsidize food, clothing, and housing for the poor.' 1
Iraqi social welfare programs are structured along socialist lines.
Agricultural collectives and cooperatives spearhead efforts at
agrarian reform and increased food production. There is extensive
central planning, but thriving private sectors exist in urban areas
such as Baghdad and Mosul. Agricultural collectivization programs
have encouraged thousands of peasants to flee to the cities, creating
severe housing shortages and poor health conditions.' Free health
and educational programs are raising the quality of life in rural
areas, and special programs have been implemented to boost the
literacy rate of women from the current level of under thirty
percent.'
See R. NYRop, B. BENDERLY, W. COVER, D. EGLIN & R. KIRCHNER, AREA HANDBOOK FOR
EGYPT 97-110 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT]. See generally
CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PUBLIC MOBILIZATION AND STATISTICS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 1951, 1952-1971, 1972 (1973).
.,. See A. Gray, Egypt's Ten Year Economic Plan, 1973-82 (paper presented at the An-
nual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 7, 1974); Holden, "Hero
of the Crossing," They Shout, "Where Is Our Breakfast?" N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975 (Magazine)
at 12-13, 71-73, 76, 78-80, 94.
' See A. SADAT, THE OCTOBER WORKING PAPER (1974); J. WATERBURY, THE BALANCE OF
PEOPLE, LAND, AND WATER IN MODERN EGYPT (1974); Sylvester, Land: The Key to Egypt's Pro-
gress, NEW MIDDLE EAST, March, 1969, at 31.
"8O 1979 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 134, at 733. Cf. 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note
101, at 965. ("While some private entrepeneurs may have benefitted disproportionately
from the private sector's greater role in economic development, the government has taken
steps to ensure that the poor are insulated from inflation and that basic commodities and
services are available at affordable prices.").
"' 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 965.
Id. at 988.
" 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 987-89. See MacPherson, The Society and Its
Environment, in IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 108 (3d ed. R. Nyrop 1979).
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3. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties
a. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion, and Assembly
All Middle Eastern governments practice a degree of censor-
ship in political matters, although only a few praetorian-populist
regimes (Iraq among them) exercise direct control over all forms
of popular expression. The Shari'a principle of free consultation
among members of the ummah is respected in most states of the
region, but such consultation usually does not bring into question
the fundamental nature or structure of government. It is in those
rare instances when such a critique is given that censorship is ap-
plied most often.
As there has been neither a tradition of political dissent in
Shari'a society nor a democratic electoral process, many Saudis
channel their grievances and petitions through informal or tribal
contacts.'" The shura system operates to provide a complex but
effective method for intra-tribal consultation on matters regarding
property or family law. 85 Another system, the majlis or "council",
allows leading government officials to meet at specified times in
open session with any citizens who seek to express their views
on political issues and register grievances." The King keeps majlis
faithfully, hearing the complaints and requests of even the lowliest
bedouin.1 "
There is strict political and moral censorship of all foreign pub-
lications, and native presses employ "self-censorship" due to the
general ban on all political activity." The government seldom prac-
tices prior censorship of domestic publications, but it reserves the
right to approve the hiring of all newspaper editors and sanctions
violators of government restrictions with the closing of their
presses for several weeks. 89 The Saudi government prohibits all
'" "Mutual consultation" is deemed an essential element of traditional Islamic govern-
ment, as Allah approves of those who consult companions. Sura 3:153. The majlis concept
has been enlarged in modern Islam to encompass the notion of a representative body "reflect-
ing the total legal wisdom of the entire community." Such a body may be appointed or
popularly elected, the only criteria for appointment or election being intimate knowledge
of the Shar'a, previous service to the cause of Islam, and character. See F. HASSAN, supra
note 4, at 47.
" Again, the concept of "mutual consultation" is woven into the Saudi social fabric. Sura
3:153.
10 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1088.
187 Id.




political parties, trade unions, and public demonstrations."'
Religious freedom is respected for all foreigners, but Saudis must
remain Moslem. The puritanical Wahhabi moral code applies to
everyone, including foreign visitors. Religious authorities are quick
to punish anyone (especially women) for immorality, and even for-
eigners have found themselves at a public whipping post for viola-
tions of liquor and dress regulations. Non-Moslems are permitted
to worship only in private, and they are expected to comply with
all Islamic holiday observances."'
The Jordanian Constitution guarantees the freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly, within certain legal limitations.1 92 Due to the
extensive and effective government bureaucracy, shura and ma-
jlis are not as widely practiced in Jordan as in Saudi Arabia;
however, personal contacts are still the key to the quick resolu-
tion of any problem. 93 The Jordanian government tolerates minor
criticism, but has closed publications in the past for their harsh
critique of national policies.' Morals are censored heavily, especial-
ly as published in foreign periodicals. 9 s Although political parties
generally are not allowed to operate, trade unions and professional
organizations are granted government licenses and serve to
transmit the views of their members to the government
bureaucracy. 9 There is complete religious freedom in Jordan. 97
The Egyptian Constitution also guarantees the freedoms of
' Id. at 1086.
19, See Rentz, Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia, in THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: SOCIETY AND
POLITICS 54 (D. Hopwood ed. 1972).
9 AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) arts. 15(i)-(ii), 16(i) (Jordan).
13 Jordanian bureaucracy has won high praise from domestic and foreign analysts for
its efficiency and ethics. A large number of displaced Palestinians comprise a majority
of the bureaucracy at lower echelons. See Shinn, Government and Politics, in JORDAN: A
COUNTRY STUDY 157, 163 (R. Nyrop ed. 1980).
1" For example, in 1979, one newspaper was closed for two weeks and members of its
staff were detained by security forces for reprinting a Western news article alleging secret
Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. 1979 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 134, at 773; 1980 COUN-
TRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1019.
1" 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1019.
19 Jordan prohibited Communist Party membership in 1953, and has required permits
for public assembly since the civil war with Palestinian guerrillas in 1970-1971. A number
of arrests of suspected members of the Communist Party or pro-PLO fedayeen groups have
been reported under the current martial law provisions. See 1979 Al REPORT, supra note
111, at 165.
'" AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 14 (Jordan).
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speech,'" press,1 assembly,2"0 and religion." 1 Here, too, an exten-
sive government bureaucracy has replaced the traditional prac-
tices of shura and majlis.2° The government owns and controls
all electronic media and exercises strict oversight of all publica-
tions, both government and private. Non-government publications
are regulated by the Shura or consultative council, which owns
fifty-one percent of each publication and holds a majority of seats
in every institutional organization.2 3
In May, 1978, a law on "National Unity and Social Peace" was
promulgated after approval by national referendum. Among its
several restrictive provisions were those condemning hostile jour-
nalists and subjecting them to harsh sanctions, including arrest
and imprisonment for "corrupting national life and subjecting na-
tional unity and social peace to danger."2' These regulations and
others like them have legalized the extensive control exercised
during the past five years over all dissident spokesmen. Since 1978,
the government has brought many journalists before the Prosecutor
General to answer to charges of subversion for articles critical of
the regime. 05 In 1980, the leading leftist newspaper Al-Ahali
suspended publication, allegedly due to government harassment,
and Al-Shaab, an opposition centrist paper, was forced to suspend
publication temporarily, claiming that the government had in-
terfered with its ability to purchase newsprint.0
Egyptian party politics are somewhat confusing at present. Since
Nasser's time, no parties have been allowed to organize along
religious or class lines, thereby eliminating the Communists and
the Moslem Brotherhood. Also barred from political activity is the
old Wafd Party, which was the conservative majority party under
AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 47 (Egypt).
Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 54.
2O Id. art. 46.
See notes 185-86 supra.
The Egyptian Shura acts as a non-legislative advisory board to the People's Assembly
and the Executive. Of its 210 seats, 140 are filled by the majority party, the New Democratic
Party. 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 967.
1978 AI REPORT, supra note 103, at 253.
Id. at 153-54. The September, 1981, crackdown on opponents of the Sadat government
included the threatened prosecution of Egyptian journalists publishing critical articles abroad
if they ever return to Egypt from their foreign assignments. An interesting issue is whether
such threats constitute exile, a penalty forbidden by the Egyptian Constitution. AL-DUSTUR
(Constitution) art. 51 (Egypt).
m 1979 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 134, at 966.
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the monarchy. 7 The government must approve all new parties,
and members of unauthorized groups are subject to trial before
the security tribunals. 8 Law No. 40 (1977) has been invoked with
increasing frequency to arrest opposition party leaders and expel
dissidents from the elected 392-seat National Assembly, thus caus-
ing some legal parties to "voluntarily" cease their activities. 10
Mubarak's New Democratic Party completely dominates every
facet of government, holding nearly five-sixths of the Assembly's
elected seats and all elected seats in the Shura under a controver-
sial new electoral list provision."' The Party also permeates the
workings of the trade union movement, which boasts some 3 million
members.212 Strikes are forbidden, although the government for-
mally confers with union leadership regarding economic policies.21
As religious freedom is protected by the Egyptian Constitution,
the government has resisted recent attempts to impose traditional
sanctions (i.e., social ostracism and even death) on Egyptians who
convert from Islam to Christianity. 15 However, the Egyptian gov-
ernment has experienced mounting friction with leaders of the Cop-
tic Christians, many of whom have criticized domestic policies loudly
and engaged in periodic disturbances with Islamic groups.1
The Iraqi regime has imposed severe restrictions on all forms
of speech, assembly, and press, constitutionally prohibiting any act
aimed at undermining the national unity of the people, provoking
racial, sectarian, or regional bigotry, or violating gains and
achievements of the nation. 1 The Ba'th Party controls the political
On February 4, 1978, the government modified the election laws to allow the Wafd
to re-enter Egyptian politics as the New Wafd Party and espouse many of its original right-
wing doctrines. However, the New Wafd dissolved barely four months later in protest against
tighter state security laws. 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at 154.
Law 40 (1977), SS 22-23 (Egypt).
2" 1979 AI REPORT, supra note 111, at 154. Leaders of the National Progressive Unionist
Party were first expelled from the Assembly, then arrested in the ensuing months on various
charges of "subversion."
210 Id.
2"1 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 967.
212 Id. at 968-69. See also AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT, s'upra note 177, at 190, 191, 298-99;
P. O'BRIEN, THE REVOLUTION IN EGYPT'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM: FROM PRIVATE ENTERPRISE TO
SOCIALISM, 1952-1965 (1966).
213 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 967.
... AL-DUSTUR (Constitution) art. 46 (Egypt).
205 See note 124, supra.
"' 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 967. See generaUy 0. Meinardus, The Coptic
Church in Egypt, in I RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 423 (1969).
17 See CONSTITUTION PROVISOIRE art. 26 (Iraq). The Constitution guarantees these freedoms
"within the limits of the law:' and protects only those means of expression "which comply
19821
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channels and institutions in Iraqi society, although other parties
are allowed to operate from time to time in concert with Ba'th
policies.218 The leadership core of the ruling Revolutionary Com-
mand Council has been integrated with the Party's Regional Com-
mand, resulting in a Sunni-dominated power structure that
endeavors to mobilize every segment of the largely Shi'ite populace
toward militant Arab unity.219 The Iraqi government strictly con-
trols all forms of media, monitoring all publications to eliminate
any criticism of the government.2 ° Iraqi Ba'thists have never been
tolerant of political dissent and have not hesitated to arrest en-
tire ethnic or associational groups thought to be a potential threat
to the Baghdad regime. 1 No assemblies other than Ba'th meetings
are allowed, unless approved for religious purposes. Government
controls have been especially harsh in the Kurdish regions of the
northeast, where illegal opposition parties and their respective
guerrilla forces remain active.'
b. Freedom of Movement, Travel, and Emigration
Most states in the Middle East allow virtually unrestricted travel.
Saudi Arabia allows free travel and emigration, but does not allow
women to drive cars or travel abroad without the permission of
their husbands or fathers, and they are expected to travel with
male companions.' Jordan and Egypt restrict travel in designated
military zones, usually near sensitive border areas. Jordan also
with the revolutionary, national and progressive trend." See Shinn, Government and Politics,
in IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 179, 192-96 (3d ed. R. Nyrop 1979).
218 The Progressive National Front has included loyal Kurdish parties and the Iraqi Com-
munist Party, although the Communists have recently been eliminated from the Front and
have resumed clandestine opposition. Shinn, supra note 217, at 196-203.
Rudolph, supra note 143, at 227-29. See generally ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY, REVOLU-
TIONARY IRAQ 1968-73: THE POLITICAL REPORT ADOPTED BY THE EIGHTH REGIONAL CONGRESS
OF THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY-IRAQ (1974); M. KHADDURI, SOCIALIST IRAQ: A STUDY
OF IRAQI POLITICS SINCE 1968 (1978); Marr, The Political Elite in Iraq, in POLITICAL ELITES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 109 (G. Lenszowski ed. 1975).
m 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 989.
" Thus, Assyrian Christians (usually under govermental protection), Freemasons (a non-
political group tolerated since the end of Ottoman rule), leaders of the indigenous Com-
munist Party (formerly allied with the government), and even leading Ba'thists who have
fallen from political grace, have been arrested for allegedly subversive activities. See 1978
Al REPORT, supra note 103, at 2591; 1979 Al REPORT, supra note 111, at 158.
2 For an excellent summary of the activity and impact of the Kurdish autonomy move-
ment, see Rudolph, supra note 143, at 224-27. See also Feili & Fromchuk, The Kurdish Struggle
for Independence, 9 MIDDLE EAST STUD. 47 (1976).
I AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA, supra note 169, at 150; 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra
note 101, at 1088.
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requires male permission for females traveling alone.224 Iraqi
domestic travel controls are pervasive, with roadblocks and police
checkpoints on major highways, and limited access to high secur-
ity areas.' Iraqi Jews have been discouraged from traveling abroad
by the imposition of excessive travel bonds and emigration fees. '
c. Participation in the Political Process
Majlis and shura remain the principal means whereby Saudi
citizens participate in the mechanisms of government, as there are
no parliamentary assemblies, political parties, or trade unions. The
traditional tribal channels of influence have special importance in
Saudi politics because all government policies are formulated by
the senior princes of the ruling family.' Numerous specialized agen-
cies have been established to deal with specific domestic issues,
but most Saudis prefer to go through traditional channels to influ-
ence such agencies. Tribal authorities have an interest in ensur-
ing the effectiveness of such political input; their own political
viability depends on adequately meeting the needs of their people.'
The Jordanian experience is more diverse, as the extensive
government bureaucracy has largely supplanted traditional means
of political access and trade unions are permitted within legal limits.
Although only one party, the Communist Party, is prohibited in
Jordan, the government has not allowed other parties to operate
freely.' Also, despite constitutional provisions for an appointed
Senate and a popularly-elected Chamber of Deputies,' the Chamber
has remained adjourned since 1973, ostensibly due to the inability
of the Jordanian government to conduct elections in the Israeli-
=' 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 967 (Egypt), 1019 (Jordan).
Id. at 990. E.g., travel to the center of Baghdad is strictly controlled.
26 Id.
AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA, supra note 169, at 166.
" See Wenner, Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites, in POLITICAL ELITES AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 157 (F. Tachau ed. 1975); I. al-Awaji, Bureaucracy
and Society in Saudi Arabia (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in the Woodrow Wilson
Dep't of Gov't and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia); S. al-Mazyad, The Structure
and Function of Public Personnel Administration in Saudi Arabia (1973) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation in the Political Science Dep't, Claremont Graduate School).
m The martial law restrictions and continued suspension of parliamentary legislation have
stifled partisan politics for an indefinite period. The only group allowed to function without
pro-government loyalties is the Moslem Brotherhood, which is kept under close surveillance
by security operatives. See Shinn, supra note 217, at 166-67. See generally Dann, Regime
and Opposition in Jordan Since 1949, in SOCIETY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN THE ARAB
WORLD 145 (M. Wilson ed. 1973).
AL-DuSTUR (Constitution) arts. 62-96 (Jordan).
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occupied West Bank area.231 King Hussein established a National
Consultative Council in 1978, composed of appointed representatives
from different regions and social, ethnic, and tribal groups. The
Council has the power to review all royal decrees, but it lacks the
veto power of its parliamentary predecessor.2" Women have been
allowed to seek elected office and must hold at least five of the
sixty seats in the Council.23 Municipal elections are still conducted
freely.234
The Jordanian labor movement contains many kinds of labor and
professional groups, but concentrates more on social welfare policies
than contractual disputes.2 5 Some strikes have been tolerated, but
arrests of some labor leaders have been acknowledged as well.
Authorities in Amman claim that such detentions have occurred
for membership in radical parties, for example, the Communist Par-
ty, and not for their trade union work per se.238
Egyptians enjoy universal suffrage, and recent decrees have
loosened the formerly strict criteria that political parties were re-
quired to meet in order to achieve government recognition.3 7 Par-
ties are not allowed to organize along religious or ethnic lines.23
All approved parties are eligible to participate in national elec-
tions for the Assembly and in municipal elections.2 9
Egyptian women have been granted almost complete political
and legal equality with men. Sadat ordered at least thirty seats
in the Assembly reserved for elected women, and female employ-
ment opportunities have increased dramatically in the past two
decades. 20 Indeed, the government's war on gender-based
' Shinn, supra note 217, at 163-65.
As the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies has left Jordanians with no means
of political expression through elected representatives, the Council appears to be more
political than legislative in nature. It is supposed to transmit grassroots opinions and
grievances to the King and his appointed Senate as an interim step toward reestablish-
ment of popular democracy. However, it appears that the Council, with its relatively weak
powers, has yet to win the confidence of most Jordanians. Id. at 164.
213 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 1020-21.
Id. at 1020.




As of January, 1980, prospective parties can apply for recognition if they have: (1)
at least fifty founding members; (2) submitted their application to a special Workers' Com-
mittee; (3) drafted a platform distinguishable from that of any other active party; and
(4) the platform conforms to the Egyptian Constitution. 1979 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note
134, at 735.
2"0 See Dodd, Youth and Women's Emancipation in the United Arab Republic, 20 MIDDLE
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discrimination has progressed so rapidly that it regularly incurs
the criticism of leading conservative ulama.4 '
The government's trade union movement currently contains some
7.5 million workers. Although organized by and theoretically under
the control of the government, the unions exercise great independ-
ence in selecting their leaders and conducting contract negotia-
tions with government-owned industries.242 The Sadat regime was
remarkably tolerant of outspoken union leadership and, when con-
fronted by a series of wildcat strikes, refused to exercise the
massive police power which his predecessor Nasser believed
effective."S
In Iraq, the Ba'th Party dominates all forms of political participa-
tion. At present, only three parties enjoy government approval:
the Ba'th party and two Kurdish parties which are strictly
controlled."" Members of the army or police services may belong
only to the Ba'th, and very few non-Ba'thists have enjoyed political
success in the Baghdad government." In June, 1980, the first elec-
EAST J. 159 (1968); L. Hamamsy, The Changing Role of the Egyptian Woman, in READINGS IN
ARAB MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES AND CULTURES 592 (1970); M. el-Sanabary, A Comparative
Study of the Disparaties of Educational Opportunity for Girls in the Arab States 29-35
(1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley).
" Since the 1952 Revolution, Egypt has been plagued with a high rate of unemploy-
ment, estimated at from 8% to 10% during the late 1970s. The national labor move-
ment has been hard-pressed to provide benefits to idle workers while unemployment con-
tinues at such a high rate. See AREA HANDBOOK FOR EGYPT, supra note 177, at 297-99 (a
summary of the history and goals of the Egyptian unions). See also Holden, supra note
178, at 12-13, 71-73; Nagi, Labor Force and Employment, in EGYPT: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND
SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1971).
24 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 968-69.
2 Id. at 969.
244 See A. AL-BAKR, STEADFAST PROGRAM IN DEALING WITH THE MASSES (Ministry of Infor-
mation Documentary Series, No. 53) (1976); ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY, HOW THE REVOLU-
TION CONFRONTS THE IMPERIALIST CONSPIRACY AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION (1977); Shinn,
supra note 217, at 196-203.
" See al-Qazzaz, The Changing Patterns of the Politics of the Iraqi Army, in ON MILITARY
INTERVENTION 335 (M. Janowitz & J. van Doorn eds. 1971); Dann, The Iraqi Officer Corps as
a Factor for Stability-An Unorthodox Approach, in THE MILITARY AND STATE IN MODERN
ASIA 257 (H. Schiffrin ed. 1976). See also Army is for Homeland and Revolution and We Will
Not Permit Its Allegiance to Become Manifold, Al-Watan Al-'Arabi June 26-30, 1978, at 1.
The Communist Party was expelled from the Progressive National Front in 1979. It has
become, with the Da'wa Party, the object of severe repression, leading in many cases to
the execution of arrested members. Large-scale purges of suspected subversives allegedly
linked with the Communist leadership began even before the Communist Party was of-
ficially outlawed. See Huge Purge in Iraq: Campaign Includes 1,000 Civil Servants, Many
of Them Ba'thists, AI-Nahar Al-'Arabi Wa Al-Duwali, April 29, 1978, at 1; Official Iraqi
Source Tells Al-Dustuir: No Political Ban Iraqi Communist Party's Activity; Ba'th Party
Rejects Policy of Open Half and Concealed Half, Al-Dustur, June 12-18, 1978, at 2; On Military
Executions, Baghdad: Responsibility Falls on Shoulders of Communist Party Leadership, Al-
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tions were conducted in Iraq since the overthrow of the monarch
in 1958. The resulting National Assembly is composed of candidates
carefully screened by the Ba'th.4 Regional and many local political
posts are appointed by the government. Municipal and labor author-
ities have no independent power. 7 Women hold sixteen seats in
the Assembly, and are encouraged to join and even lead many
Ba'thist groups. Traditional Shari'a restrictions on women are ac-
tively opposed by the government. 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Shari 'a law, with its regulation of social and political life, pro-
vides an Islamic analytical framework in which to assess the human
rights practices of Arab states. It embodies and balances two poten-
tially conflicting beliefs regarding Man and State: the utter subor-
dination of individual rights to the communal group, in contrast
with manifold provisions for social welfare needs and impartial
justice under law. In its subordination of personal autonomy, Shari'a
lays a philosophical foundation for human rights abuses by dimin-
ishing individual human significance. There is strong religious
pressure for outward conformity and obedience in the Arab state,
a fact which enables and legitimates autocratic government of the
traditional-conservative and praetorian-populist types. Ruthless sup-
pression of dissent and cruel punishment are the inhumane legacies
of Shari'a that kings and colonels employ to perpetuate their reigns.
Yet, Islamic monarchs and secular dictators also pay careful at-
tention to their people's needs for food, medicine, and education.
The requisite communion between the rulers and the ruled, im-
plicit in Shari'a, is a political and legal necessity transcending
political taxonomies.
Despite the similarities of the authoritarianism employed by
Watan Al-'Arabi June 3-9, 1978, at 4; Saddam Husayn: A Comprehensive Talk: The Revolu-
tion is not Capricious and People Who Think it has Changed its Relations with the Socialist
Camp are Fantasizing. Al-Dustudr, July 20-24, 1978, at 3.
246 1980 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 101, at 991; Shinn, supra note 217, at 186-88.
247 The eighteen regional governors are appointed by the President, as are the mayors
of Baghdad, Mosul, and other large cities. To bridge the long-standing gap between the
government and the common people, "popular councils" have been established in all ad-
ministrative subdivisions to supervise, criticize, and inspect government programs, and
to transmit popular opinions and grievances back to the Revolutionary Command Council.
Shinn, supra note 217, at 190. See also Effectiveness of People's Councils Viewed, Baghdad
Observer, March 25, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
248 Women currently hold more than 15% of all government jobs and may attain war-
rant officer ratings in the armed forces. Shinn, supra note 217, at 189; Rudolph, supra
note 143, at 243.
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traditional-conservative monarchies and praetorian-populist
regimes, careful scrutiny reveals important differences in their
responses to Shar'a values, which have critical bearing on Arab
human rights conditions. Traditional states have continued to allow
Shari'a institutions and leaders to influence criminal, property, and
family law, and to serve as an alternative to government
bureaucracy. This legal policy appears calculated to preserve the
values and maintain the allegiance of the peasants and bedouin
who comprise a majority in all Arab states. While this may im-
pede social evolution, it nonetheless ensures the doctrinal survival
of impartial justice under law. Another by-product of this policy,
perhaps unintended, is the survival of the doctrinal means whereby
impartial justice can maintain its relevance in changing social
circumstances.
Praetorian governments, on the other hand, have either swept
away traditional institutions or minimized the importance of their
leaders in an effort to effectuate the secular ideals of their urban
middle-class supporters. The legal and political power once vested
in the vice-regent of Allah now rests with the secular State, pro-
ducing a positivistic jurisprudence which diverges from the objec-
tive moral and ethical values of traditional Islam. An unfortunate
victim of such radical transformation has been the legal objectivi-
ty which gave meaning to impartial justice. Despite the cruelty,
corruption, and nepotism of traditional societies, the doctrinal
mechanisms for fairness and predictable change were present and
protected. Such is not the case in praetorian societies, a fact
reflected in the rising tide of religious fervor and political unrest
among the rural masses.
While Arab states, with their interest in communal obligations,
probably lack the necessary philosophical and historical antecedents
for Western-style democracy, that is no indication that life cannot
be improved for the individuals residing therein. Arab nations can
be encouraged to protect and assert those elements of Shar'a that
advance individual human freedom: impartial justice under law,
social welfare duties, and close communion between the govern-
ment and its people. The doctrinal elements of Shari 'a which enable
legal modernization can be employed to render cruelty, sociopolitical
elitism, and repression obsolete, as having no proper place in
modern Arab societies. By these means, the Arab nations can build
upon the best of the values which have made them a great people,
and Shari'a can afford a path to a freer future.
James Dudley
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